

Korea as Green Middle Power: Green Growth Strategic Action in the Field of Global Environmental Governance

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Abstract

In the field of global environmental governance South Korea stands out. Since 2005 it has been the initiator and central node in a majority of international networks and organizations promoting *green growth*. Based on new theoretical approaches and empirical analysis, this article highlights the significance of Korea's middle power diplomacy in relation to *green growth governance*, establishing it as a "Green Middle Power." Middle power analyses of Korea usually portray it as a regionally constrained and secondary actor in global governance. This article supplements middle power theory's behavioral approach with a *strategic action* approach inspired by Bourdieu's practice theory, which it applies to an original database of more than 1,000 sources, 18 interviews and 10 participatory observations. The article argues that Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance by demonstrating how Korea has established a sub-field of green growth governance through a wide range of strategic moves.

Key words: South Korea, middle power, green growth, strategic action, global environmental governance

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1. Introduction*

Since 2010, *green growth* has become increasingly institutionalized in the larger field of global environmental governance. It is supported by many international actors like the OECD, World Bank, UNEP, G20, B20, ASEM, C40, the World Economic Forum, as well as states such as Germany, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.¹ The relatively fast spread of *green growth* can be partly explained by changing dynamics in the larger field of global environmental governance, such as the failure of the UN system to deliver a global agreement on greenhouse gas mitigation and the trends of multi-level governance (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010), of increasing institutional fragmentation (Zelli, 2011; Zelli and van Asselt, 2013), and of a multitude of governance experiments (Hoffmann, 2011). Added to these changing dynamics, the financial crisis with its strong focus on renewed economic growth, and job creation also helped pave the way for the concept of green growth (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011; Christoff and Eckersley, 2013; Jacobs, 2013).

The question still remains why *green growth* rather than other concepts such as *low carbon*, *zero carbon*, or the lesser known *Cool Earth*² has become popular in the field of global environmental governance. In order to understand this, we must identify the actors actively promoting the concept. Here, South Korea (henceforth Korea) has played a prominent role; a comprehensive study of the history of green growth (Blaxekjær,

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¹ Based on extensive data collection, this author has found that green growth (as concept, strategy, program, and paradigm) is now used by actors ranging from international and transnational organizations, states, cities, and political parties of both socialist and liberal inclination, and is being applied to areas such as climate mitigation, climate adaptation, development, finance and investment, environment, water, forests, agriculture, trade, business and industry, technology, security, labor, health, education, and community-building. Green growth is applied globally in all regions of the world. Green growth is an essentially contested concept, sometimes called a buzzword (e.g. Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011) or mere rhetoric as opportunity for economic growth (e.g. Christoff and Eckersley, 2013). I call green growth a policy program to denote both material and ideational content of policy (for a discussion see e.g. Woods, 1995), and I do not seek to define green growth more precisely than as falling within a possible “definition’s space” (illustrated in figure 1 below).

² Promoted by Japan at the 2008 G8 summit.

forthcoming) has established that Korea was the first actor to strategically promote green growth internationally, starting in 2005. Korea is the actor that has initiated most new networks and the most connected actor in a new web of international networks and organizations promoting green growth. Korea has “put into practice the creative diplomacy and behavior that is potentially the theoretical hallmark of middle power behavior” (Beeson and Higgott, 2014: 233). Although a handful of scholars study Korea’s global strategy of transforming economic power into political power with a focus on green growth (Kalinowski and Cho, 2012; Seung, 2014; Watson and Pandey 2014), middle power analyses of Korea are generally biased towards a regional focus, except when it comes to the study of economy and trade. Further, as argued by Kalinowski and Cho, the rising BRIC countries have captured scholars’ attention, thus leading to “underappreciate and understudy” Korea (2012: 243). Addressing the relative paucity of globally orientated studies of Korea as a *Green Middle Power*, my research question is: How has Korea become a primary actor in global environmental governance? This question is answered through analysis of an original database of more than 1,000 sources pertaining to green growth, 18 interviews and 10 participatory observations. An overview of sources is presented in the appendix.

Following this introduction, section two identifies five different “images” of Korea in IR, Asian Studies, and the burgeoning Green Growth Studies. It discusses examples of middle power analyses of Korea and green growth, and suggests applying the *strategic action field approach*, which is presented in section three. Strategic action is practiced through specific strategic moves or tactics in relation to the spatial and temporal dimensions of a field. Section four analyzes the fields in question and relates them to each other to contextualize field-specific dynamics. Section five analyzes Korea’s strategic moves in the specific green growth field. Section six concludes. In summary, this article argues that the strategic actions of Korea were of fundamental importance to the establishment of a new field of green growth governance, and that Korea has shown middle-powermanship through these strategic actions and become a primary actor in global environmental governance, moving beyond a merely regional role.

2. Five images of Korea

In 1994, the Kim Young-sam government’s globalization policy explicitly tied growing economic power to an increased global political role (Saxer 2013). Since Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), Korean governments have generally incorporated the idea of Korea as middle power (Cotton, 2013), and since 2008, Lee Myung-bak further developed Korea’s middle

power diplomacy (Lee 2012; Watson and Pandey 2014). In the academic literature, images of Korea and questions of middle power are usually framed in relation to five specific issue areas. In IR and Asian Studies,³ Korea is framed in relation to 1) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), including questions of the US-alliance, security, military, peace, and nuclear issues; 2) Korea's rapid economic development from the 1980s to 2000s, 3) Korea's democratization; 4) history, especially the Japanese occupation and the Korean War; and 5) green growth. Image 1 to 4 dominate and middle power is typically equated with questions of regional power or Korea as a secondary player (for example Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Tow and Choi, 2011; Easley, 2012; Ko, 2012). Korea is only represented as having global reach in relation to economy and trade.

The fifth image of "green growth Korea" or "Korea as green power" is found in the burgeoning Green Growth Studies and in middle power analyses. The former can be roughly divided in two approaches focusing either on policy instruments and their applications (Shapiro, 2009; Jänicke, 2012; Martinelli and Midttun, 2012; Mathews, 2012; Robins, 2012; Zysman and Huberty, 2014) or policy ideas (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011; Jacobs, 2013). Even though Korea is analyzed as a case country of green growth, most accounts overlook that Korea has played a primary and entrepreneurial role in the emergence and global spread of the policy program (for example Jänicke, 2012; Choi, 2014; Seung, 2014). Furthermore, those accounts that do recognize Korea's active role globally, generally have a one-sided focus on the material side of Korea's strategy, i.e. on Korean green tech, green exports, infrastructure, and other economic gains and motives (for example Kalinowski and Cho, 2012; Tonami and Müller, 2014).

In the middle power literature, some analyses take green growth into account (Lee 2012; Saxer 2013; Seung 2014; Watson and Pandey 2014), but in a limited and cursory way. Lee's analysis, although theoretically innovative, is limited to trade, peacekeeping, ODA, and soft power in East Asia. Saxer's analysis is limited to Korea's role in the G20. Seung's analysis conflates the field of green growth with the larger field of global environmental governance and Korea is thus portrayed as a latecomer and secondary actor, when in fact Korea was on the vanguard in establishing the field of green growth. Watson and Pandey's analysis is also regionally biased, but it does argue that "new middle powers, and South Korea in particular, represent a new geography and geopolitics of environmentalism." (2014:

³ Based on a content analysis of abstracts of 737 academic works, where "Korea" appears in the abstract, and published in 39 main IR and Asia journals from January 2000 to February 2013, compiled through a Web of Science search.

76). This article seeks to remedy these absences in Green Growth Studies as well as in IR and Asian Studies by demonstrating how Korea as a *Green Middle Power* is developing a role for itself beyond its regional and secondary status.

3. Middle power from a practice theory perspective

Today, the concept of middle power is usually used to categorize states, sometimes divided into the subcategories of traditional and emerging middle powers (Jordaan, 2003). The status of being a middle power is theorized as “a product of [the] contextually located deliberate action” of these states (Jordaan, 2003: 166) also called “middle-powermanship” (Beeson and Higgott, 2014: 223). Focus has moved from structural and positivist, descriptive accounts to context sensitive and behavioral analysis, which includes studying how states strategically employ middle power diplomacy and network power (Lee 2012). To answer my research question of how Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance, I suggest that middle power theory’s behavioral approach be supplemented by the recent focus in IR on practice theory (Neumann, 2002; Bigo, 2005; Adler, 2008; Pouliot, 2008, 2010; Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Bigo, 2011; Bigo and Madsen, 2011; Adler-Nissen, 2013). Two important features of the practice approach are its field-oriented relational ontology and its focus on strong empirical analyses. It offers a way to theorize how not only economic power, but also other types of capital can be exchanged into political and symbolic capital and power, through which international actors can secure or improve their position vis-à-vis others. This is relevant for any analysis of middle powers and niche diplomacy. The focus on practices – the how-questions (cf. Beeson and Higgott, 2014) – enhances the behavioral approach of middle power theory. Also applicable in IR and middle power analysis, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) have developed a more coherent theory of fields based on the perspectives of collective social action by collective actors through strategic action:

“Strategic action fields are the fundamental units of collective action in society. A strategic action field is a constructed mesolevel social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the field.” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 9).

This is relevant as a way to understand Korea as both a collective actor (a nation state that acts in international fields) and as a field, within which actors struggle over the power of representing that state and of imposing their principles of vision and division (Pouliot and Mérand, 2013). Fields do not exist independently of other fields, although not all fields are connected. Fields can relate to each other in three ways; unconnected, dependent (hierarchical), or interdependent (reciprocal). Larger social fields like the state are composed of smaller fields, which might be related to each other within the state as field or to fields in other states. Fields can be linked to each other directly, when actors in two fields sustain routine interaction, or indirectly through ties to a third field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012).

Actors cooperate and compete, they act strategically and tactically, and this approach understands actors' interests to be more than objective economic or security interests. Fligstein and McAdam "insist that strategic action in fields turns on a complicated blend of material and 'existential' considerations." (2012: 3). Mérand and Forget apply Bourdieu's notion of strategy as a "more or less conscious pattern of trying to reproduce [or improve] one's position in a social field" (2013: 97; cf. Bourdieu, 1984). Strategy is tied to interests, which Bourdieu (1998) calls *illusio*; meaning what actors (also unconsciously) believe to be at stake in the specific field; "a feel for the game" (Bourdieu, 1998: 80; Pouliot and Mérand, 2013: 33). *Illusio* is both actor-specific and field-specific, and can be influential across fields, as is the case when, for example, "logics of economic gain intrude upon the scientific field, where this type of *illusio* is not a priori dominant" (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 34). Strategic action is related both to one's own and other's *illusio*, and it is defined "as the attempt by social actors to create and sustain social worlds by securing the cooperation of others" (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 17). This feature of cooperation and bridge-building as strategy is well-known within and thus fits well with middle power theory (Beeson and Higgott, 2014).

Strategic action is more general, where strategic moves are seen as the specific and practical employment of social skill (cf. diplomatic ability in middle power theory; Beeson and Higgott, 2014). Actors make strategic moves through certain means, instruments or capital available due to their position in the field (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984, 1991, 1998; Mérand and Forget, 2013). Practice theory has identified several strategic moves (Bourdieu, 1984; Mérand and Forget, 2013) and even more specific tactics that socially skilled strategic actors employ to induce cooperation of others (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). I suggest categorizing the different *strategic moves* as 1) *conditioning strategic action*, e.g. seizing or creating the opportunity for strategic action in the first place; 2) *timing strategic action* in relation to past,

present and future. Bourdieu distinguishes between two types of relationship between our temporal experience and the future: one relationship in which the future is much closer, almost present, where “pre-perceptive anticipations” and the “feel for the game” guide actions in a very practical way; and one relationship where the future is understood as a possible project (Bourdieu, 1984; 1998: 80). 3) *Strategic action by communicating*, e.g. framing, agenda setting, and using body language (emotions, signaling, etc.). And 4) *strategic action by networking*, e.g. coalition-building and brokering. This model is illustrated in Table 1 below. The different strategic moves are more effective when they supplement each other.

Table 1. Strategic moves of influential strategic actors.

Categories of strategic action	Strategic moves
<i>Conditioning</i>	<i>Seizing/creating the opportunity</i> <i>Launching many initiatives</i> <i>Asserting one’s position(s)/capital</i>
<i>Timing</i>	<i>Delivering (on time)</i> <i>Timelining</i> <i>Historicizing</i> <i>Futuring</i>
<i>Communicating</i> <i>(spoken, written, and body language)</i>	<i>Framing stories, values, identities</i> <i>Agenda setting</i> <i>Planting ideas</i> <i>Controlling emotions</i>
<i>Networking</i>	<i>“Neutral” brokering</i> <i>Being open-minded and inclusive</i> <i>Coalition-building</i> <i>Isolating disruptive actors</i>

4. Three fields: global environmental governance, green growth governance, and Korea

To explain Korea’s strategic actions in relation to green growth and global environmental governance, we first need to understand these three fields, Korea included. This section contextualizes these fields, what is at stake – part of the *illusio* – and how they relate to each other (see figure 2 below).⁴

⁴ For a detailed field analysis of green growth governance see Blaxekjær, forthcoming. It is beyond the scope of this article to conduct a comprehensive review of the global environmental governance literature. This literature, like the middle power literature, has shifted from the structural and statist explanations of regime theory to more constructivist approaches that better account for non-state actors and multi-level governance (Okereke and Bulkeley 2007; Bulkeley and Newell 2010). Global governance helps us understand the changing focus from the state-based anarchical system of international politics to global society and “the rise of hybrid, non-hierarchical, and network-like modes of governing on the global stage” (Strippel and Stephan 2013: 147). My analysis follows this understanding of global governance and focuses on networks and modes of governing *in practice*.

4.1. The field of global environmental governance

As empirical phenomenon, global environmental governance is a diverse, poly-centric, and fragmented field (Hulme, 2009; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; Zelli, 2011; Zelli and van Asselt, 2013), where actors share the common issue of dealing with global anthropogenic climate change, among other border-crossing environmental problems. Actors recognize that the fossil fuel dependent economy is the root cause of climate change (IPCC, 2013, 2014), but disagree about solutions and responsibilities, and diverge in their framings and narratives of the issue (Hulme, 2009; Hoffmann, 2011; Christoff and Eckersley, 2013). What is at stake is, on the one hand, the future organization of the global and national economies including issues of national sovereignty and right to development, and on the other hand the existential issue of survival, particularly for small island developing states and other developing countries (Stern, 2006; Hulme, 2009; Gupta, 2014). The 1960's saw a growing environmental awareness, and the conflict between economic growth and a healthy environment and climate was then highlighted by the Club of Rome's 1972 report, *Limits to Growth* (Hulme, 2009). Since the 1972 inaugural UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, a North-South divide perspective has dominated debates on sustainable development and green growth (Runnalls, 2011).

In Fligstein and McAdam's terms, the strategic action field of global environmental governance is composed of several strategic action fields. Some are embedded within like the United Nations climate negotiations. Others are outside, but overlapping, like nation states and their foreign, environment, and finance ministries; international organizations; energy companies; and NGOs. It is also interdependently connected to larger international fields like security, diplomacy, economy, energy, science and education, and food and agriculture. It is therefore a complex matter to determine what is at stake, and action is constrained politically, economically, and militarily by the many vested interests within the fossil-fuel economy, and the North-South divide in climate negotiations. This often boils down to a stand-off between USA and China, creating a status quo situation, which both countries presume (*illusio*) they benefit from (Christoff and Eckersley, 2013). According to middle power theory, middle powers such as Korea cannot play an entrepreneurial and primary role when a field is as divided as global environmental governance also dominated by status quo-seeking great powers. Beeson and Higgott write:

“For all the potential that middle powers may possess in theory, in practice without the agreement and participation of the ‘great’ powers, substantive and effective

international cooperation and policy innovation – difficult at the best of times – is all but impossible.” (2014: 2016).

4.2. Green growth governance

Green growth governance is a strategic action field with many specific networks, patterned behavior, and many collective actors agreeing and disagreeing about definitions of green growth (UNDESA, 2012; Scott et al, 2013; Blaxekjær, forthcoming), see also Table 2 below.

Table 2: Key examples of green growth collective actors and networks


Collective actor/network	Established by (year)
Seoul Initiative Network on Green Growth (SINGG)	Korea (2005)
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)	Korea (2010)
Global Green Growth Forum (3GF)	Denmark, Korea, and Mexico (2010)
Green Growth Alliance	Denmark, Korea, and Mexico (2010)
Green Growth Initiative	African Development Bank and OECD (2011)
Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP)	Korea, OECD, UNEP, and World Bank (2012)
Green Growth Best Practice (GGBP)	GGGI, Climate Development and Knowledge Network (CDKN), the European Climate Foundation, and the International Climate Initiative (German Government). GGGI serves as the executive agency (2012)
Green Growth Group	United Kingdom (2013)

The field of green growth governance is embedded within the larger global environmental governance field. They relate to each other in an interdependent manner, because green growth proponents are seeking to position green growth within global environmental governance as a solution to the main problems indicated above, and in competition with other solutions or policy programs such as sustainable development, low-carbon society, and ecological modernization. This power struggle feeds back into the green growth field as part of the struggle to define green growth in both theory and practice. At the general level, actors within the field share the idea that economic growth can be decoupled from greenhouse gas emissions and produce a healthier environment, climate, and better quality of life (see for

example www.greengrowthknowledge.org). Green growth is also presented as a reaction to the apparent failure of the UN climate negotiations and framed as a supplementing ‘bottom-up’ approach to the UN’s ‘top-down’ climate governance, and as a new way of bridging the North–South divide (Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen, 20 April 2012; Interview with Martin Lidegaard, Minister for Climate, Energy and Building, Denmark, Copenhagen, 12 June 2013).

Green growth can be defined within two dimensions from narrow to inclusive conceptions of growth and from anthropocentric to Gaia-centric conceptions of green (Hulme, 2009; Connely et al, 2012). Critics of green growth usually accuse it of being too narrowly focused on GDP growth and lacking social and environmental dimensions. Critics points to the many market-based actors involved in green growth and the use of neoliberal language like *public-private partnerships*, *best practices*, *climate action as an opportunity for the economy*, and management tools like PwC’s *the green growth generator* (Blaxekjær, forthcoming). However, many proponents also talk about the need for an economic paradigm shift away from neoclassical and narrow economic thinking, and green growth organization and application is increasingly directed towards aims such as poverty eradication, energy security, education, and well-being, as well as in terms of more Gaia-centric elements of projects. The green growth agenda is much broader than addressing climate change (UNESCAP, 2005; UNDESA, 2012; Zysman and Huberty, 2014; Blaxekjær, forthcoming).

Figure 1: green growth definition’s space



4.3. Korea

According to field theory, Korea is both a collective actor and a strategic action field. Korea can act internationally as a unitary state, but the country is also a field of struggles over power and positions, such as the right to form government and represent Korea in the world. This sub-section will provide some contextual information about Korea, in order to better understand Korea as an international actor, its positions and capital forms. As noted, Korea is regionally constrained. Despite growing economic power and increased integration in different bilateral and multilateral trade regimes since the 1990's, Korea has certain difficulties translating this strength into political and soft power, largely due to the regional competition with Japan and China, and its being under American leadership in terms of security (Kalinowski and Cho, 2012; Lee 2012; Cotton, 2013; Beeson and Higgott, 2014). In some soft power indexes, Korea is at the bottom (Center for Global Development, 2013), stable in the middle (Real Instituto Elcano, 2014), or rising within the middle (The Institute for Government and Monocle Magazine, 2010, 2011, 2012).

Since joining the UN in 1991 and the OECD in 1996 Korea has become increasingly important within the global system through new memberships of international organizations. In 1999, when the G20 was established, Korea joined the first meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors. The G20 Leaders met for the first time in November 2008, and Korea was chosen to host the 2010 G20 Summit, a sign of international recognition. The appointment of Ban Ki-moon as UN Secretary-General in 2007 is another example of Korea's growing international recognition, but also a reminder that Korea is seen as a good compromise, a country that is not too powerful, and as a bridge-builder between North and South. According to its economic size, Korea is a natural member of G20, and Korea was even invited to participate and speak at the G8 Summit in Japan in July 2008, the first international setting where President Lee announced the green growth program (G20, 1999, 2009). In the UN climate negotiations, Korea forms a part of the Environmental Integrity Group along with Mexico and Switzerland, a group recognized for its bridge-building role between North and South (Observations at COP17, COP18, COP19, and COP20).

Although not fully recognized in the academic literature, Korea has entered the field of global politics, and entered with very explicit global ambitions in recent years, as formulated in President Lee's "Global Korea" strategy and in President Lee's speech to the nation on the 60th anniversary of the Republic, on 15 August 2008. Korea also experiences the dilemma between economic growth and climate change. Energy consumption and imports are increasing, and with it the need for energy security. Meanwhile, temperatures in Korea


have increased twice the global average, making Korea more vulnerable than other developed countries. Prior to 2008, climate policies were protective of narrow economic interests, but with President Lee a shift occurred with both domestic and international focus on green growth and significant greenhouse gas reductions (Yun et al, 2011). Lee forged collaboration with Korean industry and garnered support for green domestic and international green action, but failed to include civil society to large extent (Choi 2014).⁵

An important element of any Korean President's *illusio* seems to be to remove the former presidents' political symbols and set one's own agenda. Even though green growth was part of Korean politics before 2008, it is largely seen as synonymous with President Lee, due to Lee's own strategic actions of timing and communicating. Thus it is now being debated in Korea to what extent President Park Geun-hye is framing a new political agenda by moving away from green growth towards concepts like the creative economy (Observations at COP17, COP18, COP19, and COP20; Korea Joongang Daily, 2013; Choi 2014). It seems likely that in anticipation of these strategic moves by the future President, President Lee took steps to secure a green growth legacy by creating enough international cooperation and commitment that would be hard to dismantle by the next President. For example, Lee's Presidential Committee on Green Growth was dissolved very quickly after Park's election. However, Lee turned the Global Green Growth Institute into an international organization, something almost impossible for a new president to remove. It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to analyze how President Park's dissociation from green growth has affected Korea's international position. However, it seems clear that for some middle powers like Australia and Korea changes in government can have bigger impacts on international strategy than international changes do (Cotton, 2013; Beeson and Higgott, 2014).

To summarize, Figure 2 below illustrates how the three fields are connected. Green growth governance is embedded within the larger and older field of global environmental governance, and Korea as field (and actor) overlaps with both.

⁵ It is beyond the scope of this article to describe Korea's climate and environment track record, but see UNEP 2010 and Choi 2014 for assessments of Korea's achievements.

Figure 2. The relationship between the three strategic action fields of global environmental governance, green growth, and Korea.



5. Korea's strategic action in the field of global environmental governance

I have observed and identified a long range of specific strategic moves, which I seek to analyze according to the model of strategic action explained above (see Table 1). Some of the identified strategic moves fit with the model, others fall outside. However, it is possible to simply extend the model with two more categories of strategic moves. Thus, I add *financing* and *policy planning* to *conditioning*, *timing*, *communicating*, and *networking*. I focus on illustrative examples from the categories of communicating, networking, financing and policy planning. I incorporate conditioning and timing when relevant. Table 3 summarizes all identified strategic moves.

5.1. Strategic action as communicating

The first example of Korea communicating green growth was in March 2005, when Korea hosted the UNESCAP's Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development (MCED5) in Asia and the Pacific (Interview with Lee Me Kyung, KOICA, Durban, 7 December 2011). The Korean diplomat, Chung Rae-Kwon, and head of division in

UNESCAP presented a short concept paper called “*green growth @ a glance*” (UNESCAP, 2005). Here green growth was framed as a solution to the bigger problems facing the Asian region. The paper drew on some of the insights from Paul Ekins (1999), an academic who was also invited to various Korean green growth policy debates in the following years. The problems identified by Rae-Kwon's paper are poverty and the need for development, and the lack of a sustainable economic growth model that can secure poverty alleviation without a high strain on the environment and climate. The causes are found in the fossil fuel economy and population growth. The concept paper also links to the value of a right to (sustainable) development, to the Millennium Development Goals, and the moral responsibility for future generations, as well as the environment. At MCED5 green growth was recognized by participants, and Korea's initiative, *The Seoul Initiative Network on Green Growth (SINGG)* was adopted. However, the Korean development model had yet to provide a credible environmental and climate solution (Yun et al, 2011; Dent 2012). This issue was initially solved discursively through a temporal move, which introduced a distinction between the model of the past and the model for the future; a model and paradigm shift that was further laid out when President Lee enters the stage in 2008.

When President Lee began to communicate green growth internationally, first at the G8 Extended Summit in Japan July 2008, the Korean green growth agenda entered a new phase. In this phase, the focus was still on the developing world, but economic growth began to feature more prominently as part of the solution, especially as a selling point towards developed countries and companies, and by pointing to the global economic crisis as a problem and an opportunity for a much needed paradigm shift. Following the collapse of UN negotiations at COP15 in 2009, green growth was also described as a solution able to bridge the otherwise diverging interests of the developing and developed world, and the Korean development model was again presented as a template. President Lee and other representatives historicized Korea's experience as a recently developed country in order to present Korea as a trustworthy bridge-builder (Interviews with Park Chinjung, Policy advisor, PCGG, Doha, 1 December 2012, and Helen Mountford, Deputy Director, Environment Directorate OECD, Doha, 7 December 2012).

Communicating green growth was also, somewhat unexpectedly, linked with cultural capital when in mid to late-2012 Korean artist Psy became a global YouTube billion-click phenomenon with *Gangnam Style*. The Korean government already ran a state-supported global branding strategy, which includes the promotion of K-pop to bolster Korean soft power (www.koreabrand.net), and the Presidential Committee on Green Growth seized the

opportunity and asked Psy to do a video promoting Korea's green growth efforts as part of Korea's official bid to host the UNFCCC's Green Climate Fund (GCF) (Psy, 2012). Korea won the bid on 20 October 2012 and the GCF was placed in a new eco-city some 100 km from Seoul (GCF 2012). In Korea the ability to attract the GCF was seen as a great victory, bearing in mind that Korea was able to host the G20 Summit in 2010 in the name of green growth, but failed to win the bid to host COP18, which went to Qatar – a partner country in the Green Growth Alliance. Furthermore, as an example of seizing the opportunity and coupling green growth with political capital, the UN General-Secretary Ban Ki-moon is publicly supporting Korea's initiatives like the Global Green Growth Summit. Personal ties most likely play an important role in this connection; the first chairman of GGGI from 2010-2012, Han Seung-soo (former professor of economics; career diplomat, former prime minister 2008-2009) was Ban Ki-moon's superior, when Han served as President of the UN General Assembly in 2001-2002.

Over the years, communicating green growth has become more detailed, nuanced, and increasingly global and local in scope as more and more Korean officials have been trained in the art of communicating green growth, which was presented by Han Seung-soo as one of his main achievements between 2010–2012:

“I also went around the country to speak, explain and educate the middle ranking officials at division director level on what is meant by the challenge of climate change and green growth paradigm. A total of about 7,000 officials attended these meetings.” (Han, 2012).

Even though green growth was developed and implemented before President Lee, the history being written now (in reports, brochures, speeches, etc.) often begins with President Lee and his speech to the Korean nation on the celebration of the Republic's 60th anniversary in August 2008. Although the audience at the time was Korean, the speech itself is being retold globally and has its own symbolic life. The story is also increasingly one of Korea becoming a global leader:

“At the OECD, Korea championed the OECD Ministerial Declaration on Green Growth in the depth of the global financial crisis in 2009, which included a call for a major horizontal project on green growth strategies. The report from the project was released in May 2011, followed by the declaration of Secretary-General Angel Gurría

to mainstream green growth into OECD's programs, calling President Lee Myung-bak of Korea *the father of green growth*." (Interview with Yu Bok-hwan, Secretary General, PCGG, 5 December 2012).

Symbolic body language is also applied; when President Lee or Korean diplomats explain the difference between Korea and other developed countries' approaches to developing countries they stretch out both hands with palms up and say that "Korea gives with two hands in a humble manner, where others give with only one hand". While illustrating this gesture they implicitly say that other donor countries take back with the other hand (Interview with Park Chinjung, Policy advisor, PCGG, Doha, 1 December 2012). Koreans seek to tell a coherent story of a country transforming to the green economy in all spheres of society, partnering with other global leaders, and wanting to "share the green growth experience with the world" as one video playing at the COP meeting shows (Observations at COP18 and COP19). But it is one thing to communicate and story-tell green growth and another to implement it through concrete action. This is where strategic action such as networking, financing, and policy planning become essential as ways to put ideational concepts into action and give them life in material structures.

5.2. Strategic action through networking

Korea pursues the green growth strategy through *networking*, which is a more concrete way of giving the idea of green growth a lasting institutional form, through partnerships, alliances, organizations, conferences, and networks. Thus the specific organizational materiality of green growth in itself begins to impose symbolic meaning onto the field of global environmental governance. This materiality is part of setting the borders of the field. Setting up or hosting international organizations is a recognized international practice through which states can position themselves and earn political and economic capital. Korea has been the initiating part in networking green growth involving more than 100 partners (Blaxekjær, forthcoming). Many of these connections have been established through the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), which in late 2012 became an international organization, and remains headquartered in Korea. The GGGI partner countries are Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, China (Yunnan Province), Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Germany, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Mongolia, Morocco, Norway, Qatar, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. Also, Korea has set

up a new Korean think tank with global ambitions, the “Green Technology Center – Korea”, and the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund is positioned by Korea as part of the Korean green growth network (Interview with Park Chinjung, Policy advisor, PCGG, Doha, 1 December 2012).

As mentioned, these networking strategic moves began in 2005 with the SINGG under UNESCAP, and in 2008 at the G8 Summit President Lee announced the East Asia Climate Partnership to which Korea earmarked \$200 million. The EACP was a continuation of the government’s regional middle power focus. The focus started to broaden with the OECD and G20 activities. Korea chaired the OECD Ministerial Council meeting in Paris in 2009, and here Korea was instrumental to the new OECD Declaration on Green Growth commissioning OECD to develop a green growth strategy, which was completed in 2011 (Interview with Helen Mountford, Deputy Director, Environment Directorate OECD, Doha, 7 December 2012). Korea hosted the 2010 G20 Summit in the name of green growth. Since 2011, the GGGI and 3GF have held six-monthly green growth summits. Networking as such is not spoken or written in text, and needs interpretation and further research, but the connections established are quite apparent. The many organizations and networks of regional (Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Africa, and Latin America) or global scope are bringing together the developing and developed world countries, as well as public and private sectors actors (both big business and SME sector), and civil society. Korea also approached ICLEI to set up a local ICLEI office in Korea (Conversation with *Gino Van Begin*, Secretary General, ICLEI, Doha, 5 December 2012). With ICLEI as partner green growth is also framed as being local in scale with a focus on city-planning. Networking strategies are also bringing in the financial means through international and regional development banks and the new Green Climate Fund. The strategies also cover technology, R&D, and innovation. Networking strategies supplement what is being communicated, especially by signaling that global environmental governance is possible despite the stalemate of the UN climate negotiations and that it is more inclusive and contributes more to bridge-building than the UN organizational set-up. Further, it signals that (Korean) green growth is the right choice, because it is not just words, but dedicated, organized and financially backed by action with all relevant stakeholders in a fragmented and multi-level governance field (see section 5.3).

Through the GGGI, further networking and policy-making takes place with local offices around the world. People play a central role in the strategic move of networking: Korean diplomats are placed as green growth “ambassadors” in central positions in partner organizations, and there is a great exchange of diplomats, politicians, and experts between

Korea and partner countries and other organizations. By involving European pro-environment countries and green businesses – a strong priority of the B20 Summit, which was part of the G20 Summit in Korea in 2010 – Korea is tapping into these actors' green credibility (political capital) as well. The GGGI has worked closely with the OECD, UNEP, and the World Bank to establish the Green Growth Knowledge Platform, with the main purpose of exploring, developing, and spreading green growth theory and practice. Guilt by association can also be positive. Korea and the GGGI benefit from the global identity and credibility of its recognized partners such as the UNEP, OECD, and World Bank experts. This is also a mode of accumulation of especially political, knowledge, and symbolic capital with which Korea can advance its own position and the green growth policy program within the larger field of global environmental governance.

One particularly strong relationship is the one between Korea and Denmark. Together they have founded the Green Growth Alliance, and the former Danish Prime Minister Løkke Rasmussen (2009-2011), a liberal like President Lee, became chairman of the GGGI in 2012-2013. For Korea, the active Danish support and advocacy of green growth was important to bring to the project some of the credibility that Korea had not been able to show yet. Denmark has a long history of environmental development and it is globally recognized as environmentally friendly, and – while this is debatable – it is sometimes mentioned as one of few countries in the world, which has achieved a decoupling of economic growth and environmental degradation and GHG emissions. It is quite likely that Korea presented the idea of green growth as a global environmental policy to the Danish government in 2009 during the planning phase of COP15. The Danish government had actually announced a green growth strategy in April 2009, but far from an international agenda this was focused on achieving a reduction in the environmental impact and greenhouse gas emissions of Danish agriculture (Ministry of the Environment, 2009). It seems likely that Korea provided the last push for shift of the Danish government's green growth strategy from domestic agriculture to international relations and global environmental governance. Certainly, COP15 held in Copenhagen in December 2009 – was an opportunity for both Korea and Denmark to be seized, as a global communication platform for announcing their partnership and dedication to green growth.

5.3. Strategic action through financing

Financing is an important supportive part of framing green growth, which stresses that Korea means business; putting the money where the mouth is. Green is also the symbolic color of

money. Furthermore, in Korea green symbolizes energy and fresh start, and is often associated with businesses and good fortune. This quote by former chairman of GGGI, Han Seung-soo, in a speech at Chatham House Director's Breakfast summarizes the financial resources Korea committed domestically to green growth rather well:

“A total of 50 trillion won (\$40 billion USD) was allocated for the period 2009–2012 on nine key green projects. (...) New demand and markets created through such initiatives would add 956,000 new jobs. (...) Additionally, I instructed the cabinet to draw up a First Five-Year Green Growth Plan. (...) Under the Plan, 107 trillion won (\$97 billion USD), two percent of annual GDP, is being spent on green growth projects under ten specific policy directions. It is estimated that the first Five-Year Plan will induce production worth 182-206 trillion won (20% of 2009 GDP) and create 1.6 to 1.8 million jobs (a 10% rise in employment) by 2013.” (Han, 2012).

Korea has been praised by the UNEP (2010) for delivering the world's biggest green “new deal” as response to the financial crisis in early 2009. Korea also finances projects through environmental foreign aid in developing countries; through EACP as mentioned above, but also through GGGI projects. Many of the organizational structures mentioned above are supported by cross-financing from other partner countries and businesses, Denmark, Norway, Japan and Australia which make significant contributions to GGGI. Despite the fact that GCF is not officially a green growth instrument, Korea still presents the GCF funds as a part of green growth. Also, Korea's new development aid approach is in many ways combined with green growth (Tonami and Müller 2014).

Lack of financing is understood as a problem in global environmental governance, and one of the causes of the continued disagreements between North and South (Observations at COP17, COP18, and COP19). It is identified as one of the fundamental stumbling blocks for the project of creating a paradigm shift towards a green economy. To abandon the brown economy and fossil fuels and to provide alternative and economically viable solutions requires a huge shift in financing – divestment in the brown economy and investment in the green economy. It is a sign of recognition of Korea's competent performance that many partners in the GGGI have decided to place parts of their foreign development aid funds in GGGI. For example, Denmark and Norway have recently decided to renew their funding, despite sharp domestic criticisms of this type of development aid. In this sense, what Korea is doing through financing is framing these problems and causes, but also illustrating that green

growth can provide financing that flows to the developing world. The combination of green growth and the Korean development model is framed as a credible and morally just solution to the global crisis experienced by the developing world, especially under circumstances where the UN system does not provide the finances that had been promised by the developed world. Further, the financial agreements underlying the green growth public-private partnerships illustrate that Korea is also getting the private sector on board financially, something that is recognized in the field as an achievement of green growth compared to the concept and approach of sustainable development (see also Christoff and Eckersley, 2013).

5.4. Strategic action as policy planning

Korean policy planning seeks to incorporate green growth and to show concretely how it can and should be implemented. Korea has undertaken green growth policy planning domestically, as well as internationally in many developing countries. The extent and speed of domestic policy planning supports communication strategies and also illustrates just what Korea means when describing itself as a fast mover. Policy planning transforms words into action. From 2005 to 2008, policy planning took place through the SINGG and the EACP focusing on the Asian region and development. Policy planning picked up in speed and extent from mid-2008 after President Lee's speech to the nation. The PCGG then became responsible for further development of national green growth policies, with the National Strategy and Five-Year Plan for Green Growth released on the 6th of July 2009, and the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth enacted on the 13th of January 2010 as its key milestones. Green growth policy planning in Korea covers areas such as energy, environment, climate, economy and finance, international trade, business, technology, research, consumer and civil society, foreign policy, development and aid, and education (Interview with Park Chinjung, Policy advisor, PCGG, Doha, 1 December 2012). Korea's strategy for green growth is laid out in the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth, which clearly states that Korea understands green growth as both a national and an international strategy. Through national examples, The Framework Act commits Korea to spread the green growth policy program and planning through international cooperation:

“[The Framework Act] mandates strengthening environmental diplomacy to tackle climate change and to increase international cooperation as a world leader in the field of green growth. It promotes information sharing and networking with international

organizations and foreign governments to jointly pursue global green growth.” (GGGI, 2011: 30).

Policy planning as strategic action supplements the other strategic actions. The way policy planning is communicated, organized, financed and implemented illustrates two points. Firstly, the importance of setting up a hierarchy of policy-making structures: a vision and strategy on top, then a green growth plan and framework law and financing in place, and lastly implementation through PPP's and Best Practices. Secondly, through GGGI's international partnerships, communicated globally, Korea takes part in concrete policy planning exercises in developing countries, which enhances Korea's access to many kinds of capital and improves its global position. The Korean green growth (future) development model is applied, and often the GGGI, with backing from UNEP, OECD, and World Bank, is leading the green growth planning. GGGI has assisted in developing policy plans in several countries, for example Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Costa Rica.

When looking into GGGI country projects, some general features stand out. Although taking the lead in developing the plans and analyzing potential policy areas for green growth transformation, it is significant and in line with the overall strategy of positioning Korea as a bridge-builder, that Korea involves partner countries in the process. Specifically, the GGGI asks representatives from the partner countries to be in charge of setting up the policy planning organization and processes, and to help identify policy areas of interest in the green transformation, in order to give the partner countries ownership of the policy planning and thus of the implementation. Developing countries experience that Korea takes them seriously. From the GGGI's perspective being a facilitator of planning and bridge-building rather than an executive organization, the strategy is to anchor the green growth policy planning at the highest possible political level in order to ensure support for the implementation. The GGGI's role is comparable to that of an external consultant and “neutral” broker. It draws on the experience of former McKinsey consultants and delivers analyses of project risk management and identifies sources of both support and risk (Interview with Hans Jakob Eriksen, Director, GGGI Copenhagen regional office, 9 January 2013; Conversations with Howard Bamsey, Director-General, and Mattia Romani, Deputy Director-General, GGGI, Warsaw, 18 November 2013).

Table 3. Korea's strategic action and strategic moves in relation to green growth governance

Categories of strategic action	Strategic moves
Conditioning	<p><i>Seizing/creating the opportunity</i> <i>Launching many initiatives</i> <i>Asserting one's position(s)/capital</i> <i>Strong global presence</i> <i>Setting up information platforms (on/offline)</i></p>
Timing	<p><i>Delivering (on time)</i> <i>Timelining</i> <i>Historicizing</i> <i>Futuring</i></p>
Communicating	<p><i>Framing stories, values, identities</i> <i>Agenda setting</i> <i>Planting ideas</i> <i>Controlling emotions</i> <i>Hosting international meetings</i> <i>Delivering high-level speeches</i> <i>Creating and spreading commercial material</i> <i>Creating and spreading academic material</i> <i>Showcasing work through ceremonies</i></p>
Networking	<p><i>"Neutral" brokering</i> <i>Being open-minded and inclusive</i> <i>Coalition-building</i> <i>Isolating disruptive actors</i> <i>Establishing think tanks, international organizations, and networks</i> <i>Joining think tanks, international organizations, and networks</i> <i>Setting up local offices of own organizations in partner countries</i> <i>Signing memoranda of understanding with partners</i> <i>Recruiting people with international experience, network and skills</i></p>
Financing	<p><i>Allocating enough finances to be recognized as willing to invest</i> <i>Investing economically in one's own and others' international projects</i> <i>Securing investments from other actors</i> <i>Hosting financial organizations</i></p>
Policy planning	<p><i>Dedicated domestic policy planning as example to follow</i> <i>Supporting policy planning in partner countries</i> <i>Adapting policy planning to practical concerns of partner countries</i> <i>Constructing legal and institutional framework in a hierarchy of vision-strategy-plan</i> <i>Involving expert resources from international organizations like the OECD, the World Bank and the UNEP</i> <i>Involving local knowledge resources to secure legitimacy and support for implementation</i></p>

6. Conclusion

Supported by many international actors, the field of green growth governance has become increasingly institutionalized in the larger field of global environmental governance. Korea has initiated many of the new networks and research shows that it is the most connected actor in this green growth field (Blaxekjær, forthcoming). In short, Korea has “put into practice the creative diplomacy and behavior that is potentially the theoretical hallmark of middle power behavior” (Beeson and Higgott, 2014: 233). However, middle power theory has not explained this empirical phenomenon, nor how Korea is establishing itself as *global* middle power. Thus the aim of this article was to investigate how Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance. In order to answer this question, the article had to move beyond the image of Korea as a regionally limited middle power of secondary status, and supplement middle power theory’s behavioral approach with a Bourdieusian practice theory focusing on strategic action fields and strategic action. This new theoretical model enabled categorization of middle powers’ strategic action as *conditioning, timing, communicating, networking, financing, and policy planning*, the latter two added through inductive analysis. This theoretical innovation opened for the empirical analysis of the strategic action and the specific strategic moves undertaken by Korea in its efforts to establish green growth as a sub-field within the field of global environmental governance.

They key contributions of this article are as follows: It has explained, firstly, through what specific strategic moves Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance, a *Green Middle Power*. Secondly, it has demonstrated the usefulness of combining middle power theory’s behavioral approach with strategic action theory, which enables a better understanding of the issue areas and collective actors under study as strategic action fields. This combined *middle power strategic action* approach integrates both material and ideational content, and it is founded on strong empirical analyses of specific strategic moves. This theoretical innovation should be applicable to many other cases in IR and it would help nuance our understanding of global governance and the primary role middle powers can play. It allows for a deepening of the explanatory ambitions of middle power theory, and enhances the capacity of middle power theory to inspire strategic policy development.

This productive approach raises questions for further research on Korea as a strategic action field. For example, how did green growth develop and change as a national and international political strategy across different Korean governments? What is at stake within Korea as strategic action field, and which actors have struggled, won and lost in the processes

of defining and developing Korea as a green middle power? Because of Korea's prominent role in the field of global environmental governance, these questions will not only contribute to the understanding of Korea as a Green Middle Power, but also help us gain a better understanding of the global strategic action field of green growth governance.

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Appendix: Overview of sources

Table 4. List of interviews.

Name and position of interviewee(s)	Place of interview	Time of interview
<i>Kristian Ruby</i> , Assistant to the European Union Climate Commissioner, Connie Hedegaard.	European Commission, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Dan Jørgensen</i> , Member of the European Parliament (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), Vice-Chair ENVI, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety.	European Parliament, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Annika Ahtonen</i> , Policy Analyst, European Policy Centre.	European Policy Centre, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Lee Me Kyung</i> , Policy Advisor, Climate Change Office, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)	COP17, Durban, South Africa	7 December 2011
<i>Marie-Louise Wegter</i> , Head of Office, Global Green Growth Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. <i>Erik Næraa-Nicolajsen</i> , Deputy Head of Office, Environment, Climate and Energy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. <i>Tomas Anker Christensen</i> , Head of Centre, Global Challenges, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen.	20 January 2012
<i>Park Chinjung</i> , Policy advisor, Korea's Presidential Committee on Green Growth.	COP18, Doha, Qatar	1 December 2012
<i>Yu Bok-hwan</i> , Secretary General of Korea's Presidential Committee on Green Growth PCGG Director (Email interview).	COP18, Doha, Qatar	5 December 2012
<i>Helen Mountford</i> , Deputy Director, Environment Directorate OECD.	COP18, Doha, Qatar	7 December 2012
<i>Hans Jakob Eriksen</i> , Director, GGGI Copenhagen regional office	Phone interview	9 January 2013
<i>Lars Løkke Rasmussen</i> , Danish Prime Minister (2009-2011 and 2014-), Chairman of GGGI May 2012 to September 2014. (E-mail interview for background only).	Copenhagen, Denmark	29 April 2013
<i>Martin Lidegaard</i> , Denmark's Minister for Climate, Energy and Building.	Copenhagen, Denmark	12 June 2013
<i>Kim Joy</i> , Programme Officer, Green Economy Initiative, Economics and Trade Branch, United Nations Environment Programme .	Phone interview	19 December 2013

Table 5. List of conversations.

Name, position and event	Place of conversation	Time of conversation
<i>Eva Grambye</i> , Head of Office, Global Green Growth Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Meeting with secretariat and political science students.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen.	1 November 2012
<i>Seungwon Lee</i> , Director for Development Cooperation Division Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea. Side event organized by Korea. (Including copy of powerpoint presentation from side event).	COP18, Doha, Qatar	1 December 2012
<i>Gino Van Begin</i> , Secretary General, ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability. Following side event organized by Korea.	COP18, Doha, Qatar	5 December 2012
<i>Yu Bok-hwan</i> , Secretary General of Korea’s Presidential Committee on Green Growth PCGG Director. Side event organized by Korea. (Including powerpoint presentation from side event with notes).	COP18, Doha, Qatar	5 December 2012
<i>Howard Bamsey</i> , Director-General, GGGI. After “Interview from Warsaw UNFCCC Climate Studio TV” event.	COP19, Warsaw, Poland	18 November 2013
<i>Mattia Romani</i> , Deputy Director-General, Green Growth Planning & Implementation, GGGI. After “Interview from Warsaw UNFCCC Climate Studio TV” event.	COP19, Warsaw, Poland	18 November 2013

Table 6. Field observations.

Name of event	Place of event	Time of event
Global Green Growth Forum 2011, Plenary debate I, II, III, and IV.	Copenhagen, Denmark	11-12 October 2011
Take Lead Conference, experts' workshop on communicating Green Growth.	Copenhagen, Denmark	12 October 2011
The Green race to Durban and Beyond: A debate on comparability, competitiveness and compatibility of climate actions around the world. Arranged by the Greens, European Free Alliance in the European Parliament.	European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium	9 November 2011
The Durban Climate Change Conference. COP17/CMP7.	Durban, South Africa	28 November - 9 December 2011
The Doha Climate Change Conference. COP18/CMP8.	Doha, Qatar	30 November - 7 December 2012
Asian Development Bank's Launch of Asian Development Outlook 2013.	Copenhagen, Denmark	19 April 2013
STRING green growth working group meeting.	City of Hamburg, Germany	23 April 2013
The Warsaw Climate Change Conference. COP19/CMP9.	Warsaw, Poland	13-21 November 2013
Global Green Growth Forum 2014.	Copenhagen, Denmark	20-21 October 2014
The Lima Climate Change Conference. COP20/CMP10.	Lima, Peru	1-14 December 2014

Overview of sources in green growth database.

The material I have collected and included in what I refer to as my green growth database (if not including interviews and observations) consists of a large sample (more than 800 units) of digital material like reports, concept notes, posters, press releases, meeting invitations, meeting agendas, meeting minutes, summit declarations, conference invitations, conference material, photos and videos, news articles, figures and tables, websites and specific website pages (copied to pdf), and academic articles and blogposts. In addition I have obtained more than 200 units of physical material at events. This material consists of reports, papers, meetings invitations, meeting packages, and merchandise. From these sources I have created a historical timeline of events with dates, place, organisers, and main content/purpose. From this list I have created a database in excel which lists actors (and years of appearance), green growth networks, actors connections and actor memberships in networks. The database displays 379 actors in the years 2005 to 2013 (see Table 7 below). For an analysis of the emergence and spread of green growth see Blaxekjær (forthcoming).

Table 7. Type and number of actors in the green growth governance field (2005-2013).

Actor type	Number
State	95
Company	64
Research and policy	47
Forum and network	45
Development, finance and investment	41
City	36
Multilateral organisation	35
Region	10
NGO	6
Total	379